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Abstract
This paper analyzes the convergence and incentive properties of the multi-item
auction procedures constructed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Demange,
Gale and Sotomayor (1986) when buyers’ preferences are Lipschitzian. At first,
it is shown that the $\mathrm{m}\ddot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ equilibrium price vector of the auction market is a
Lipschitzian function with respect to the buyers’ characteristics (preferences
and amounts ofbudgets). Then the error bounds of the procedures are derived
depending on the Lipschitzian paramete.rs, and the $\epsilon$-nonmanipulability of the
procedures is proved.
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1. Introduction
This paper considers some auctions on a buyer-seUer market of heterogeneous
indivisible objects such as used cars or housings in a general environment with
non-linear preferences and budget constraints. Former researches focus on the
direct auction mechanisms making use of the revelation principle. These
mechanisms are formulated as the continuum mechanisms neglecting operating
costs where all bidders (buyers) report their non-linear demand fimctions or non-
linear preferences. The non-linearity is important, since it reflects income
effects of the demand behavior. Hence, in order to reduce the cost, we have to
approrimate these mechanisms by discrete or finite mechanisms as discussed in
Hurwicz and Marschak (1985).
We $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\cdot \mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ approximation problem as an $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{\uparrow}\mathrm{s}$ problem: how
to set bid increment for a given degree of the approrimation, depending on some
(publicly known) parameters of the market such as the number of the objects,
under the incomplete information assumption: the auctioneer does not know the
buyers’ individual characteristics. Moreover, the auctioneer may also consider
the bid increment to keep the incentive compatibihty.
At first, a general property of the market is shown. Fixing the sets of
objects and buyers, a market is identified by the buyers’ characteristics. For
each market, the minimal equilibrium price vector is defined as the minimal
vector in the set of equilibrium price vectors of the market. Then it is shown
that the al equihbrium price vector is a Lipschitzian fimction with respect
to the buyers’ characteristics (preferences and amounts of budgets), when the
preferences are Lipschitzian.
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Second, we apply the result for the auction procedures with bid increment in
the market to solve the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{s}$ problem. We show that the $\mathrm{e}\iota \mathrm{T}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ bound of
an auction procedure is given by the product of its bid increment and a constant
depending on a uniform bound of individual Lipschitzian parameters. We also
show that if the bid increment is less than a positive constant, then behaving
honestly is an $\epsilon$-dominant stratey for each bidder.
2. The buyer-seler market and the minimal price equihbrium
In this section, we formulate a buyer-seller market [ $\mathrm{M},$ $(\succeq_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}}, \mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I})$ ; $\mathrm{N},$ $(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}$ ,
$\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}]$, and define the competitive equilibrium of the market. Let $\mathrm{M}=\{\mathrm{i}_{1},$ $\mathrm{i}_{2},$ $\cdots$ ,
$\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{m}},\}_{\backslash }$. be the set of seUers and $\mathrm{N}=\{\mathrm{j}_{1},\mathrm{j}_{2}, \cdots,\mathrm{j}_{\mathrm{n}}\}$ be the set ofbuyers.
Inihally every seUer $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$ owns one unit of $i$-type object denoted by the i-th
unit vector $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{M}}$ which $\mathrm{i}$ can sell in the market, and $i$ holds an amount of
money $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}(>0)$ . $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}i’ \mathrm{s}$ consumption set $\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is $\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}=\{\mathrm{e}^{0},$ $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}\rangle\cross \mathrm{R}$ where $\mathrm{e}^{0}$ is
the origin of $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{M}}$, and $i’ \mathrm{s}$ preference ordering $\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}$ is a complete preordering on
$\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}$ . The symmetric and asymmetric parts of $\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}$ are denoted by $\sim_{\mathrm{i}}$ and $\succ \mathrm{i}$’
respectively. We assume the following conditions for each seUer:
$\mathrm{S}_{1}$ (Monotonicity for money): For all $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}$ , it holds that
$(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x}+\Delta \mathrm{x})\succ \mathrm{i}(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})$ for all $\Delta \mathrm{x}>0$ .
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$\mathrm{S}_{2}$ (Archimedean wiffi desirabihty): For all $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{X}_{\iota}$ , it holds that
$(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\sim_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{x}+\Delta \mathrm{x})$ for some $\Delta \mathrm{x}\geq 0$.
For each $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$ , it holds by $\mathrm{S}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{S}_{2}$ that there is a unique number $\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}}\geq 0$ such
that $(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}})$. We call the number $\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ffie $resema\hslash on$ value of $\mathrm{e}^{i}$.
Moreover it holds by $\mathrm{S}_{1}$ that $(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}})\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})$. Hence we have that
$(\mathrm{e}^{i},\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})$ , which implies that $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ is desirable. Furthermore, it holds by
$\mathrm{S}_{1}$ that $(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})\succ \mathrm{i}(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, 0)$, which implies that money is indispensable.
Every buyer $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ owns no object inlitially, but holds an amount ofmoney
$\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}(>0)$ with which $\mathrm{j}$ can buy one object in the market. Set $\mathrm{T}=\{\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}1, \cdots, \mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{m}}}\}$
and $\mathrm{X}=\mathrm{T}\cross \mathbb{R}$ . Buyer $j’ \mathrm{s}$ consumption set is X, and the preference ordering $\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}$
is a complete preordering on X. The symmetric and asymmetric parts of $\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}$
are denoted by
$\sim_{\mathrm{j}}$
and $\succ \mathrm{i}$ ’ respectively. The preference $\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}$ is assumed to
$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\theta$ the fouowing conditions:
$\mathrm{B}_{1}$ (Monotonicity for money): For all $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{X}$ , it holds that
$(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x}+\Delta \mathrm{x})\succ \mathrm{i}$
$(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})$ for all $\Delta \mathrm{x}>0$.
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$\mathrm{B}_{2}$ (Archimedean with $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\eta$ ): For ffi $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{X}$, it holds that
$(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\sim_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{x}+\Delta \mathrm{x})$ for some $\Delta \mathrm{x}\geq 0$.
$\mathrm{B}_{\}$ (Indispensabihty ofmoney): $(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})\succ \mathrm{i}$ $(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}},0)$ for ffi $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$.
$\mathrm{B}_{4}$ (Regularity): $(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}-\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}})\succ \mathrm{i}$ $(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})$ or $(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})\succ \mathrm{i}(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}-\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}})$ for all $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$.
A price vector $\mathrm{p}$ is a non-negative vector in $\mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{M}}$ . Let $\mathrm{P}$ be the set of price
vectors. The supply correspon&nce, $\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{P})$ of $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$ and ffie&mand correspon-
&nce, $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{P})$ of $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ are defined by
$\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{P})=$ { $\mathrm{x}\in\{\mathrm{e}^{0},$ $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}\}$ : $(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}-\mathrm{x},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{p}\cdot \mathrm{x})\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}-\mathrm{y},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}}+\mathrm{p}\cdot \mathrm{y})$ for all $\mathrm{y}\in\{\mathrm{e}^{0},$ $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}\}$ };
$\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{P})=$ { $\mathrm{X}\in \mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{P})$ : $(\mathrm{x},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}-\mathrm{p}\cdot \mathrm{x})\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{y},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}-\mathrm{p}\cdot \mathrm{y})$ for all $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{P})$ },
where $\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{P})=\{\mathrm{X}\in \mathrm{T}:\mathrm{p}\cdot \mathrm{x}\leq \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}\}$ . A triple $(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})\in$ Px $\mathrm{T}^{\mathrm{M}}\cross \mathrm{T}^{\mathrm{N}}$ is called a
$\mathrm{c}ompeti\hslash ve$ equilibrium iff
(i) $\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{P})$ for all $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$;
(\"u) $\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}\in \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{p})$ for all $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$;
(iii) $\Sigma_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}}\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}}=\Sigma_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}$ .
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The existenc$\mathrm{e}$ of a competitive equilibrium under the conditions $\mathrm{S}_{1}$ , % and
$\mathrm{B}_{1}-\mathrm{B}_{4}$ is $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$-known in this market, see Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986). Under
these conditions, a sufficient condition for the existence of the active competitive
equihbrium is that $(\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}-\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}})\succ \mathrm{i}$ $(\mathrm{e}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})$ for some $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$ and some $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
For a competitive equilibrium $(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})$ , we call $\mathrm{p}$ an equilibrium price vector.
Let $\mathrm{p}*$ be the set of equihbrium price vectors.
We need some definitions for the next proposition: at a competitive
equilibrium $(\mathrm{p}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})$, we draw a directed graph $\mathrm{G}$ whose vertices are Mu $\mathrm{N}$ by
the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ffies: for any $(\mathrm{i},\mathrm{j})\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{N}$
(Rule $0$) Draw an arc ffom $\mathrm{i}$ to $\mathrm{i}$ ;
(Rule 1) If $\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ , then draw an arc $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{j}$ to $\mathrm{i}$;
(Rule 2) If $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{P})$ and $\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}\neq \mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ , then draw an arc $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}$ to $\mathrm{j}$ .
A subset $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}_{1},$ $\mathrm{i}_{2},$ $\cdots,$ $\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{m}}$ } of MU $\mathrm{N}$ is called a path of $\mathrm{G}$ iff there is an arc of $\mathrm{G}$
ffom $\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{k}}$ to $\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{k}+1}$ for each $\mathrm{k}=1,2,$ $\cdots,$ $\mathrm{m}-1$ .
Proposition 1 (Existence and characterization of the minimal equilibrium price
vector; Miyake 1994) : Assume $\mathrm{S}_{1},$ $\mathrm{S}_{2}$ and $\mathrm{B}_{1^{-}}\mathrm{B}_{4}$ .
(A) there exists the minimal equilibrium price vector $\mathrm{p}^{*}$ in the sense that
(i) $\mathrm{p}^{*}\in\{\mathrm{p}\in \mathrm{P}^{*} : \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}\geq \mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}}\}$ ;
(ii) $\mathrm{p}^{*}\leq \mathrm{p}$ for all $\mathrm{p}\in\{\mathrm{P}\in \mathrm{p}* : \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}\geq \mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}}\}$ , where $\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is the reservation value
of $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ .
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(B) Let $(\mathrm{P}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})$ be a competitive equilibrium. Then $\mathrm{p}$ is the minimal
equihbrium price vector iff for every seUer $\mathrm{i}^{*}\in \mathrm{M}$ there is a path of $\mathrm{G}$ starting
ffom $\mathrm{i}^{*}$ to $\mathrm{k}\in\{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}:\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}=\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}}\}\mathrm{u}\{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}:\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}=\mathrm{e}^{0}\}$.
To present Miyake’s (1998, Theorem 1) non-manipulability theorem of the
$\mathrm{a}1$-price equihbrium in our market, we need some definitions, $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{2}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ sets of
agents $(\mathrm{M}, \mathrm{N})$ and sellers’ characteristics $(\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}}$ . Let $\Phi$ be the set of
buyers’ proffies $\varphi=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\Phi\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{g}$ the conditions $\mathrm{B}_{1}$ through $\mathrm{B}_{4}$ . Lt $\mathrm{p}^{*}$
be the fimction $\mathrm{p}^{*}:$ $\Phiarrow \mathrm{R}^{\mathrm{M}}$ which assigns the al equihbrium price vector
$\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi)$ ofthe market $[\mathrm{M}, (\succeq_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}})_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}} ; \mathrm{N}, \varphi]$ for each $\varphi\in\Phi$ . Let $Q^{*}(\varphi)$ be
the set of equihbrium demands ofbuyers corresponding to $\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi)$ for each proffie
$\varphi\in\Phi,$ $\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}$, $\mathcal{D}^{*}(\varphi)=$ { $\mathrm{d}=(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}$ : $(\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi),$ $\mathrm{s},$ $\mathrm{d})$ is a competihve equihbrium.}.
Proposition 2 (Nonmanipulability of the continuum mechanism; Miyake $1998\rangle$:
Suppose $\varphi^{*}=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}*, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{i}^{*}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi$ be the tru$\mathrm{e}$ profile of buyers’ characteristics.
Then it holds that for all $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\varphi=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi,$ $(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in \mathcal{D}^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*} , \varphi_{-\mathrm{j}})$ and all
$(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in \mathcal{D}^{*}(\varphi)$
$(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \varphi_{-\mathrm{j}})\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}})$ $\succeq_{\mathrm{j}^{*}}$ $(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi)\cdot \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})$ ,
where $(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*} , \varphi_{-\mathrm{j}})=(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{\mathrm{j}-1} , \varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*} , \varphi_{\mathrm{j}+1} , ... , \varphi_{\mathrm{n}})$.
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Proposition 2 states that the (continuum) mechanism which sel$\mathrm{e}$cts a minimal-
price equihbrium for a reported profile $\varphi\in\Phi$ is non-manipulable for each buyer.
Namely, when $\varphi^{*}=$ $(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}*, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi$ is the true profile, it is a dominant
strategy for each buyer $j$ to report $j’ \mathrm{s}$ true characteristics $\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}*, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})$ to
the mechanism.
3. The multi-item auction procedures and Lipschitzian error
bounds
This section applies our $\mathrm{r}e$sults to auctions based on Asami (1990), Crawford
and Knoer (1981), Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) and Miyake (1998).
We describe the auction procedure for $\varphi\in\Phi$ , assuming all buyers $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ play
as bidders. Let 6 be a positive number. This 6 represents the fixed amount of
increment of a price in the auction. The 6-auction procedure is defined as
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ :
Rl: The time structure is given by $\mathrm{r}=1,2,3,\cdots$ . The.prices at time $\mathrm{r}\geq 1$ are
represented by a price vector $\mathrm{q}(\mathrm{r})=(\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{r}))_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}}$ in P. The auctioneer sets the
initial price vector $\mathrm{q}(1)=(\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{i}})_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}}$ and announces the bid increm$e\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}6>0$ .
Initially no buyer is $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ to an object.
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R2: At time $\mathrm{r}\geq 1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ unconlnitted bidders bid simultaneously. $\mathfrak{W}\mathrm{e}$ bid $\mathrm{b}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{r})$ of
unconlnitted bidder $\mathrm{j}$ is an element in $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{q}(\mathrm{r}))$. (Bidder $j$ may choose any
element in $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{q}(\mathrm{r}))$ . ) Let $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{r}}=\{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}:\mathrm{b}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{r})=\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ for some uncomInitted bidder
$j\}$. Fhen the transihon and stopping rules are given byffie fouowing.
(1) If a bidder $\mathrm{j}$ has been committed to some $\mathrm{i}$ in $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{r}}$ , $\mathrm{j}$ becomes
$\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\iota\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ ;
(2) Every seUer $\mathrm{i}$ in $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{r}}$ selects (arbitrarily) one, $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{i}}$, offfie bidders who bid for $\mathrm{j}$,
and then $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is conlnitted to $\mathrm{i}$ and the other bidders who bid for $\mathrm{i}$ are $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{U}$
$\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\iota\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ ;
(3) If a bidder $\mathrm{j}$ bids for ffie nlffi item $\mathrm{e}^{0}$ , i.e., $\mathrm{b}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{r})=\mathrm{e}^{0}$ , ffien $\mathrm{j}$ goes out ffom
the auction;
(4) If there is no uncommitted bidder in th$\mathrm{e}$ auction, the auction stops;
otherwise the auction proceeds to the next round $\mathrm{r}+1$ , setting q(r+l) by
$\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{r}+1)=$ $\{$
$\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{r})+6$ if $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{r}}$
$\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{r})$ offierwise,
for all $\mathrm{i}\in$ M.
R3: If the auction stops at time $\mathrm{r}^{*}$ , a bidder $\mathrm{j}$ who is committed to $i$ buys $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$
at the effect\’ive price when $j$ bids for $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ .
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Fixhng a 6-auction procedure (history), the resultant trade of the 6-auction is







for $\mathrm{g}i\in \mathrm{M}$ ;
$\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}}=$
$\{$
$\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$ if some buyer $j$ buys $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{i}}$







for all $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$.
By $\mathrm{R}2(3,4)$ and the budget constraint the 6-auction terminates in a finite tim$\mathrm{e}$ .
Since a bidder’s selection of the bid $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}$ his demand set in R2 and the selection
of a bidder in $\mathrm{R}2(2)$ may not be unique, the resultant trade $(\mathrm{p},\mathrm{s},\mathrm{d})$ of 6-auction
also may not be unique. We write the set of resultant trades of 6-auction for $\varphi$
$\in\Phi$ as $\mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$ .
In order to derive the properties of $\mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$ , we assume an additional
condition:
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$\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{g}}$ (Lipschitzian condition): There exist two positive numbers $\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{j}},$ $\beta_{\mathrm{j}}>0$ such
that:
if $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\sim_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{e}^{0},\mathrm{y})$ and
$(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x}+\Delta \mathrm{x})\sim_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{e}^{0},\mathrm{y}+\Delta \mathrm{y})$ for $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{R},\Delta \mathrm{x}>0,$ $\Delta \mathrm{y}>0$,
ffien $\infty_{\mathrm{J}}\geq\Delta \mathrm{y}/\Delta \mathrm{x}\geq$ $\beta_{\mathrm{j}}$ .
We call the number $\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{j}}\equiv\alpha_{\mathrm{i}}/\beta_{\mathrm{j}}$ Lipschitzian coefficient, since the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\dot{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{g}$
proposition holds:
Propoeition 3 (Existence of a nicely Lipschitzim utility function): If $(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})$
satisfies $\mathrm{B}_{1^{-}}\mathrm{B}_{5}$ , then there exists a real-valued function $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}$ on X such that:
(i)
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}$ is a $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{h}\mathfrak{h}^{r}$ fimction of $\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}$ , i.e.,
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x})\geq \mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{t}^{*}, \mathrm{y})$ iff $(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x})\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{t}^{*}, \mathrm{y})$ for all $(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x}),$ $(\mathrm{t}^{*}, \mathrm{y})\in \mathrm{X}$
(\"u) $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}$ is nicely Lipschitzian in the sense that for each $(\mathrm{t},\mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{X}$
$\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{j}}$
$\geq$
$[\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x}+\Delta \mathrm{x})-\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x})]/\Delta \mathrm{x}$
$\geq$ 1 for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\Delta \mathrm{x}>0$.
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For any A $\geq 1$ , let
$\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}=$ { $(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi:(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})$ satisfies $\mathrm{B}_{5}$ and A $\geq \mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{j}}$ for each $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ }.
The main results of this paper are the fouowing two theorems:
Theorem 1 (Lipschitzian error bounds): For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\varphi=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ and all $6>$
$0$, it holds that
$\max$ $\max$ $||\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}^{*}(\varphi)-\mathrm{q}_{\mathrm{i}}||$ $<$ $6\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\gamma}$,
$(\mathrm{q},\mathrm{s},\mathrm{d})\in \mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$
where $\gamma\equiv 4+2\cdot\min[|\mathrm{M}| , |\mathrm{N}|]$.
Theorem 2 ($\epsilon$-nonmanipulability of the discrete mechanism): Suppose $\varphi^{*}=$
$(\succeq_{\mathrm{i}^{*}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ be the true characteristics ofbuyers. For any $\epsilon>0$ , set the




Ihen it holds that for all $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\varphi=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}},$ $(\mathrm{q}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})\in \mathrm{T}((\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \varphi_{-\mathrm{i}});6)$
and all $(\mathrm{r},$ $\mathrm{t},$ $\mathrm{D}\in \mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$
$(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{q}\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}+\epsilon)$ $\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}*$ $(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{r}\cdot \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})$ .
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4. Proof of theorems
We ne$e\mathrm{d}$ a Iripschitzian property of the al price equilibrium. For any $\mathrm{I}>$
$0$ , define a subset $\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})$ of $\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ by
$\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})=$ { $(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}},$ $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ : I $>\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ for all $\mathrm{j}$ }.
Note that $\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I}^{1})\subset\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I}^{2})$ whenever $\mathrm{I}^{1}\leq \mathrm{I}^{2}$ . In order to state the
Lipschitzian property of $\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi)$ on $\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})$ we have to introduce a pseudo-metric
on $\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})$. For any two $\mathrm{r}e\mathrm{a}1$-valued continuous functions $\mathrm{f}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{f}_{2}$ on X,
define a pseudo-metric $\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{I}}$ for $\mathrm{I}>0$ by
$\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{I}}(\mathrm{f}_{1}, \mathrm{f}_{2})=$ $\max$ $||\mathrm{f}_{1}(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x})-\mathrm{f}_{2}(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x})||$.
$(\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{x})\in \mathrm{T}\cross[-2\mathrm{I}, 2\mathrm{I}]$
Since nicely Iipschitzian fimctions are continuous, we define a pseudo-metric $\mu_{\mathrm{I}}$
on $\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})$ by
for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\varphi=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}},$ $\varphi^{*}=(\succeq, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{i}^{*}\in\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})$ ,
$\mu_{\mathrm{I}}(\varphi, \varphi^{*})=$ $\max[\max_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{I}}(\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}), \max_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}||\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}-\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}||]$,
where $(\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}$ and $(\mathrm{U}^{*})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{i}$ are the utility functions for $(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}$ and $(\succeq)_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{i}^{*}$
defined in Proposition 3, respectively. Then we have the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$propositions:
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Proposition 4 (Lipschitzian continuity of $\mathrm{p}^{*}$ ): For any $\mathrm{A}\geq 1,$ $\mathrm{I}>0$ , the
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}e\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\eta$holds:
$\max_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{M}}||\mathrm{P}^{*}\mathrm{i}^{(\varphi^{1})-\mathrm{P}^{*}\mathrm{i}^{(\varphi^{2})}}||\leq$ $\mu_{\mathrm{I}}(\varphi^{1}, \varphi^{2})\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\xi}$ for all $\varphi^{1},$ $\varphi^{2}\in\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})$,
where $\xi\equiv 2+2\cdot\min[|\mathrm{M}|, |\mathrm{N}|]$.
Proposition 5 (Emkdding $\mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$ into $\Phi$): For all $\varphi\in \mathfrak{A}\mathrm{A},$ $\mathrm{I}$), $6>0$, and all
$(\mathrm{q}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})\in \mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$ , there exists some $\varphi^{*}\in\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I}+6)\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}6^{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ .
(i) $\mathrm{q}=\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi^{*})$ and $\mathrm{d}\in \mathcal{D}^{*}(\varphi^{*})$ ;
(\"u) $\mu_{\mathrm{I}+6}(\varphi, \varphi^{*})<$ 6 $(\mathrm{A}+1)^{2}$
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix any $\varphi=(\succeq_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ and fix I $> \max_{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}$ . It
holds that $\varphi\in\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I})\subset\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I}+6)$ . Set $\Phi^{*}=\{\varphi^{*}\in\Phi(\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{I}+6),$ $\mu_{\mathrm{I}+6}(\varphi, \varphi^{*})<$
$6\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{2}\}$ . Then it holds by Propositions 4 and 5 that:
$\max$ $\max$ $||\mathrm{P}^{*}\mathrm{i}^{(\varphi)-\mathrm{q}}||$ $\leq$ $\max$ $\max||\mathrm{p}^{*}:(\varphi)-\mathrm{P}^{*}\mathrm{i}^{(\varphi^{*}\rangle}||$
$(\mathrm{q},\mathrm{s},\mathrm{d})\in \mathrm{T}(\varphi;8)$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$
$\varphi^{*}\in\Phi^{*}$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{M}$
$<$ 6 $(\mathrm{A}+1)^{2}\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\xi}$ $<$ 6 $(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\xi+2}$
$\Re \mathrm{I})$
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Proof of Theorenl 2: Suppose $\varphi^{*}=(\succeq_{\mathrm{i}^{*}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ be the true
characteristics ofbuyers. For all $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\varphi\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}},$ $6>0,$ $(\mathrm{q}, \mathrm{s}, \mathrm{d})\in \mathrm{T}((\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*} , \varphi_{-\mathrm{i}});6)$,
($\mathrm{r},$ $\mathrm{t},$ $\mathrm{O}\in \mathrm{T}(\varphi;6)$, and all $(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in\varpi^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*} , \varphi_{-\mathrm{j}})$ , ffie following lemma holds:
Lemma 1: (i) $\mathrm{U}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}\mathrm{i} , \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{q}\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}})+6\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\xi+4}>\mathrm{U}^{*}(\mathrm{d}^{*}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i} , \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \varphi_{-\mathrm{i}})\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})$,
where $\xi$ is the number defined in Proposition 4 and $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}$ is the utility ffinction
for $\succeq^{*}\mathrm{i}.$ (\"u) There exists some $\varphi^{0}\in\Phi_{\mathrm{A}}$ satisfying
(a) $\mathrm{r}=\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi^{0})$ and $\mathrm{f}\in\Phi^{*}(\varphi^{0})$ ;
(b) $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \varphi_{-\mathrm{i}})\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})$ $>$
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}\mathrm{j}\mathrm{j}\mathrm{j}-\mathrm{j}\mathrm{j}}^{\#(\mathrm{d}^{0},\mathrm{I}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi^{*},\varphi^{0})\cdot \mathrm{d}^{0})}-6\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\xi+4}$ for all $(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{0})_{\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}}\in D(\varphi_{\mathrm{i}}^{*} , \varphi_{-\mathrm{j}}^{0})$ .
For any $\epsilon>0$ , set the bid increment 6 as $\epsilon\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{-\gamma-3}=\epsilon\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{-\xi-5}>6$
$>0$, which imphes that
$\epsilon/2$
$\geq$ $\epsilon/(\mathrm{A}+1)$ $>6\cdot(\mathrm{A}+1)^{\xi+4}$ .
Then Lmma 1 and Proposition 2 together imply that
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{q}\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}})+d2$ $>$ $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*} , \varphi_{\dot{\triangleleft}})\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*})$
$>$ $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{0}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}, \varphi_{\dot{\triangleleft}}^{0})\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}^{0})-\epsilon/2$
$\geq$
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}} , \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{p}^{*}(\varphi^{0})\cdot \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})-\epsilon/2$ $=$
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{r}\cdot \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})-\epsilon/2$ .
Thus we have by Proposition 3 that
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{q}\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}+\epsilon)$
$\geq$
$\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{q}\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}})+\epsilon$ $\geq \mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{r}\cdot \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})$
and $(\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{q}\cdot \mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{j}}+\epsilon)$ $\succeq_{\mathrm{i}^{*}}(\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}}, \mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{j}}^{*}-\mathrm{r}\cdot \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{j}})$. QED
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